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I. INTRODUCTION

We all type on the "QWERTY" keyboard, even though it is inefficient.
Microsoft advertises that its BING search engine is superior to Google in

a side by side comparison, 2 yet when the Authors, and probably our
readers, do an Internet search, we use Google. Even closer to home for
lawyers is when a form document includes a boilerplate provision. We
rarely question or change it, we have seen the provision a hundred times
and understand its consequences-so why fix what is not broken?
These examples and countless others illustrate the central theme in this
Article-that sometimes a product, in our case a body of law, is chosen
not necessarily for its superiority, but rather because we arefamiliar with
it. There may be more efficient computer keyboards, search engines, and
boilerplate provisions at hand; however, we like the tried and true
methods-the ones we are familiar with. This is true in everyday life, and
as we attempt to show in this Article, it is also true when corporations
choose to be governed by one3body of law over another, with potentially
millions of dollars on the line.

1.
See generally Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 332, 332-33 (1985) (discussing the development of the QWERTY typewriter
keyboard and the more efficient typewriter keyboards developed after it). See also Brett
H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competitionfor Corporate
Chartersin the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 705 (2003) (citing
Paul David's work for the proposition that QWERTY was initially adopted precisely
because it was slower, which helped early typewriters avoid jamming). But see S.J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1990)
(disputing the idea that QWERTY is inefficient).
2.
Mike Nichols, Take the Bing It On Challenge!, BING BLOGS (Sept. 6, 2012),
http://blogs.bing.com/search/2012/09/06/take-the-bing-it-on-challenge/ [http://perma.cc/D5
VN-XTX7].
3.
Market Capitalizationof Listed Companies, WORLD BANK, http://data.world
bank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD [http://perma.cc/L2AD-YBJ8] (showing the market
capitalization of public corporations in the United States in 2012 was over $18 trillion)
(last visited May 20, 2015).
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One of the enduring topics of interest in corporate law is why the tiny
state of Delaware dominates the market for incorporations, especially
incorporations of the most powerful and profitable firms.4 The "internal
affairs" rule allows corporations to choose which state's law will govern5
.
their corporate affairs, whether or not the corporation has ties to that state
Voluminous literature on the topic largely credits Delaware's dominance
in attracting incorporations to factors relating to the inherent quality of its
corporate law and the business expertise of its judges who hear corporate
law disputes. Another strand of literature credits Delaware's network effects.
Either way, Delaware is no doubt winning the "race" for incorporations,7
long beating other states, 6 and holding the federal government at bay as well.
The cause and normative implications of Delaware's success, however,
are hotly debated. Under the "race-to-the-top" view, Delaware prevails
because it provides a body of corporate law that maximizes shareholder
value. 8 In comparison, under the "race-to-the-bottom" view, Delaware
dominates the market for corporate charters by offering laws that favor
senior management and other insiders at shareholders' expense.9 Both

Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
4.
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 578 (2002)
(reporting that 58% of public companies are incorporated in Delaware); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where To Incorporate,46 J.L. & ECON. 383,
391 tbl.2 (2003).
5.
ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 107 (2009).
6.
See Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware 's Corporate Law Too Big to Fail?, 74 BROOK.
L. REV. 75, 77 (2008) ("[T]he idea of the race [between states] being a strong one has worn
thin in recent academic work.").
See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491,2494
7
(2005) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware's Politics] (analyzing Delaware's autonomy in
structuring its corporate law with regards to potential federal intervention); Mark J. Roe,
Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003) [hereinafter Roe,
Delaware's Competition] (arguing that any "race" is between Delaware and the federal
government rather than Delaware and other states).
8.
The classical race-to-the-top works include Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law,
ShareholderProtection, and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 25466 (1977); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle,
I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212-27 (1991); and ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-31 (1993).

9.
The classical race-to-the-bottom works include William L. Cary, Federalism
and CorporateLaw: Reflections upon Delaware,83 YALE L.J. 663,663-68 (1974); Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in CorporateLaw, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); Oren Bar-Gill et al., The
Market for CorporateLaw, 162 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 134 (2006).

sides of the debate focus on the substantive features of Delaware corporate
law, the difference being whether Delaware law is thought to benefit
shareholders or benefit management at shareholders' expense.
This Article is not another race-to-the-top versus race-to-the-bottom
story. Instead, it demonstrates something new-while Delaware may
have begun its ascent to the top of the corporate law hierarchy by offering
more desirable law than its leading competitor, 0 it stays there as much
because it is familiarto business parties as for its substantive virtues. In
this respect, we attempt to show Delaware's resemblance to the aforementioned
QWERTY keyboard, Google search engine, and form document's boilerplate
provision.
This Article builds on our prior empirical research showing that,
everything else equal, start-up firms' 2 financed by out-of-state investors
are more likely to incorporate in Delaware.' 3 We argue that this finding
is due to out-of-state investors' familiarity with Delaware corporate law,
and relative lack of familiarity with the corporate law of the start-up's

10. New Jersey led the state race for incorporations until 1913, when Woodrow
Wilson (then New Jersey's Governor) advocated the "Seven Sisters Act," which prohibited
corporations from owning stock in other corporations. These new restrictions in New
Jersey's corporate law-not found in Delaware's corporate law-led to Delaware taking
the lead in the incorporations race-a lead it has never relinquished. See Christopher
Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 677,
677-78 (1989) (recounting these historical events in New Jersey); McDonnell, supra note
1,at 727-32.
11.
An important work related to our own is William J. Carney, George B. Shepherd
& Joanna Shepherd Bailey, Lawyers, Ignorance, and the Dominance of Delaware
CorporateLaw, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 123 (2012). Professors Carney, Shepherd & Bailey
survey corporate attorneys regarding factors influencing choice of domicile and find that
that lawyers believe one advantage of Delaware relative to their home state corporate law
is that more investors across the country are familiar with Delaware than with their homestate corporate law. Id. at 137-38. Our contribution is consistent with their results, but in
addition provides a theory to distinguish familiarity from network externalities, and reports
empirical data showing that investor familiarity can influence choice of domicile. Id. at
677-78.
12.
For a better idea of what we mean by "start-ups," as opposed to so-called
"lifestyle" small businesses, see Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of
Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1406 (2008) (noting start-ups are "high-risk,
high-growth" companies funded by angel investors and venture capitalists).
13.
Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware Law as
Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 868 (2014). Our prior study
used two statistical techniques, VC fixed-effect analysis and a first-differences analysis of
reincorporation, to isolate a causal relationship between out-of-state financing and choice
of domicile. See id. at 869. We refer interested readers to our prior article for questions about
the statistical analysis. The primary contributions of our current article are to develop a
model of investor familiarity, distinguishing it from network and learning effects, and to
explore in greater detail the normative implications of investor familiarity for the competition
for corporate charters.
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home state. In the current project, we extend our prior research by (i)
developing an informal model distinguishing investor familiarity from
related economic theories of network effects and learning effects, (ii)
showing that our data are more consistent with familiarity than with these
alternative explanations, and (iii) discussing normative implications of the
familiarity effect for corporate choice of domicile. Since our prior work
was written primarily for economists, this Article publicizes our empirical
findings to legal scholars and practitioners. In addition, the normative
implications of our findings should be of great interest to scholars following
the corporate federalism debate.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, the Article
provides a theory for how investor familiarity impacts a private firm's
choice of domicile and uses a numeric example to distinguish familiarity
from related economic theories of network effects and learning effects.
Part III discusses the results of our prior study testing for a familiarity
effect and recaps those findings, including new regression results showing
familiarity's role as a dominant explanation for Delaware's dominance,
contrasting familiarity's effect with that of substantive law quality and
network effects. Part IV explores normatively what our familiarity findings
might mean for state competition and the overall quality of Delaware law.
Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II.

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF FAMILIARITY

What does it mean to suggest that Delaware law is "familiar" to
investors? We have already given some examples that attempt to illustrate
familiarity's role in decisions we all make on a day-to-day basis, for
example, the QWERTY keyboard. Perhaps a closer analogy is the use of
English as a common language, or linguafranca,in international business
deals.' 4 For instance, if a party from Japan wants to contract with a party
from France and neither speaks the other's language, this could present a
hurdle to closing the deal. It would at least increase the deal's transaction
costs as one party would have to hire a translator to help overcome the
language barrier. However, the ability to settle on English as a language
familiar to both parties, even though it is neither party's native tongue, can

14.
See Broughman, Fried & Ibrahim, supra note 13, at 866; John F. Coyle, Rethinking
the CommercialLaw Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV. 343, 366 (2011) (showing substantive treaties

reduce transaction costs because of a wide variety of individuals from different nationalities are
familiar with them).

overcome that hurdle and allow for the contract's execution. 5 English, being
a universal language, serves as a lingua franca for the Japanese and French
investors. 16 As demonstrated in this Article, we believe that Delaware law
serves the same lingua franca function for investors from different
American states. Delaware is the universal language of corporate law. 7
A. Theory: FamiliarityVersus Network Externalities
Our theory of familiarity is straightforward. Business parties are familiar
with a body of law if they have studied it and used it in the past.
Familiarity relates to a party's own knowledge and comfort with a particular
body of law.
Familiarity with a particular body of law can impact contract negotiations
by lowering transaction costs. For example, if an entrepreneur seeking
external financing incorporates in a state that provides corporate law
familiar to her prospective investors, this will make it easier for such
investors to evaluate the terms of financing. By contrast, investors may
be reluctant to negotiate a financing contract if they are unfamiliar with
the relevant body of corporate law. If asked to do so, the investors are
likely to demand a lower price for the firm's shares (i) to protect them
from potential opportunism18 or (ii) to compensate for the cost of learning

15.

ANNA MAURANEN & ELINA RANTA, ENGLISH AS A LINGUA FRANCA: STUDIES

AND FINDINGS, 1 (2009) ("English has established its position as the global linguafranca
beyond any doubt ....");Coyle, supra note 14, at 367 ("There is no doubt that a
substantive treaty is capable of serving as a common language to persons from different
legal backgrounds."); Tsedal Neeley, Global Business Speaks English: Why You Need
Language Strategy Now, HARV. Bus. REv. 117, 117 (May 2012) ("Ready or not, English
is now the global language of business.").
16. Hyejin Ku & Asaf Zussman, Lingua Franca: The Role of English in
InternationalTrade, 75 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 250, 258-59 (2010); Julie M. Spanbauer
& Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Embracing Diversity Through a Multicultural Approach to
Legal Education, I CHARLOTTE L. REv. 223, 223 (2009) ("As a result of globalization, the
English language is fast becoming 'a global lingua franca.'). See also Coyle, supra note
14, at 367 ("It is possible, in other words, for the national law of a particular state to serve
as a lingua franca that reduces transaction costs in transactions touching on multiple
jurisdictions.").
17. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1559, 1581 (2002) ("Delaware is... much like a common language and such lawyers are
'bilingual,' speaking Delaware law plus the local dialect.").
18. Investors may be especially concerned if an entrepreneur incorporates in a state
that the entrepreneur (or her legal advisor) is familiar with but the investors are not. In
this case, the entrepreneur could use her informational advantage to take advantage of the
investors. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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a new body of law.19 Everything else equal, by selecting a familiar body
of corporate law an entrepreneur can lower her cost of capital.
Concepts related to familiarity in the economics literature need to be
distinguished. For example, "network effects" and "learning effects,"
collectively thought of as "network externalities," can also enhance the
value of a product beyond that product's substantive merits.20 In our case
the "product" is Delaware corporate law. 21 Delaware law benefits from
learning effects due to the sheer number of firms previously incorporated
in Delaware and the body of law that has resulted.22 Delaware law also
benefits from network effects because the more incorporations it attracts
now and in the future, the more corporate law it will produce going
the more that parties use Delaware corporate
forward. Like the telephone,
23
law, the more value it has.
Network effects and learning effects are closely related, the difference
being temporal.24 Learning effects focus on past use, while network effects
focus on contemporaneous and future use. 25 If we do attempt to parse
them out, learning effects may be the easiest to see in the incorporations
context. For decades, Delaware has attracted the majority of public
26
incorporations and as a result had developed substantial legal precedent.

19.

See, e.g., Ola Bengtsson & Dan Bernhardt, Different Problem, Same Solution:

Contract-Specializationin Venture Capital, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 396, 416
(2014). In many cases this cost may simply represent heightened legal fees. The investor's

lawyer will charge more to do legal work using an unfamiliar body of corporate law.
20.

Michael Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, andNetworks of Contracts,

81 VA. L. REV. 757, 763 (1995) ("When a product exhibits network externalities, the basic
market model of microeconomics does not apply. That model, which links individual
value-maximizing behavior with social optimality, does not take account of the
interdependence in value that network externalities create.").
Id. at 775 (noting that a body of law can be a product).
21
22
In another illustration of learning effects, Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have
examined implied versus express contract terms. Becausejudicial precedents have incorporated
implied terms into contracts over the years, future parties benefit from the learning effects
of those terms. The parties, in fact, favor those implicit terms over terms that are explicit
but less often used. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice:
An Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 261, 289 (1985).

23. See Klausner, supra note 20, at 772 (noting that the telephone's value as a
product increases with each new user).
24.
See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network
Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 569 (1998).
25. See id
26. See, e.g., Klausner, supra note 20, at 844 n.263.

For these reasons it is likely that investors have previous experience with
Delaware corporate law. This predictability enhances Delaware's attractiveness
to business parties regardless of its substantive virtues. 27 Simply knowing
what the law is, and how to plan
in accordance with that law, adds value
28
above the content of that law.

Network effects are perhaps less obvious. Michael Klausner observes
that the "quality of a state's future case law depends on the number and
diversity of lawsuits brought before its courts. These factors in turn
depend on the number of firms incorporated in a state." 29 Thus, it is not
simply what Delaware has done in the past, but what it will continue to do
in the future. Because a new firm knows that Delaware is where most
firms incorporate, it expects "ex ante to benefit from judicial interpretations
involving other firms, and from the development of legal expertise in the
future."30
By contrast, an explanation of a particular firm's choice of domicile,
our familiarity, or lingua franca, does not consider the total number of
firms incorporated in Delaware, or even the total number of business
parties familiar with Delaware law. Rather, our focus is only on the parties
at the bargaining table. If a private firm is receiving financing from a
group of investors who are unfamiliar with the firm's home-state corporate
law, but are familiar with Delaware law, then this firm will be relatively
more likely to domicile in Delaware. The key issue is the relative
familiarity of the parties at the bargaining table.

27. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 1,at 681, 686, 701.
28. Brett McDonnell believes that learning effects help Delaware but do not pose a
substantial barrier to competing states. He observes that other states can promise to copy
Delaware precedents wholesale, thus negating Delaware's learning effects advantage.
McDonnell, supra note 1,at 702 ("[S]tates can match the learning effects gained by a
leading state's case law by adopting wholesale the existing case law of that state."). This
is debatable, however, as other courts without Delaware's expert judges might not get the
copying right. For example, in Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp., 978 F. Supp. 1342 (D.
Nev. 1997), Nevada courts attempted to apply the Unocal standard of Delaware takeover
law, and held that the target company did not have reasonable grounds for believing a
threat to corporate policy existed. Id. at 1348 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 953, 955 (Del. 1985)) (but holding that "ITT has shown no real harm to
corporate policy or effectiveness"). But that Unocal prong is almost always satisfied when
Delaware courts hear a Unocal case. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward
a New Theory of the ShareholderRole: "SacredSpace" in CorporateTakeovers, 80 TEX.
L. REV. 261, 293 n.160 (2001) (citing Hilton Hotels for the proposition that
"[i]nterestingly, courts outside Delaware that adopt the Unocal standards seem more
inclined to take the first prong seriously"); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the Nature of
Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 167 (2003) ("There is
almost no meaningful judicial review under Unocal's threat prong [in Delaware].").
29. Klausner, supra note 20, at 845.
30. Id. at 762.
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To be sure, the reason investors and their lawyers are familiar with
Delaware law may be driven in large part by network and learning effects.
To illustrate, a law school professor may choose to emphasize Delaware
law in her corporations class not because of its inherent quality, but rather
because so many firms are already incorporated there. Put another way,
the professor wants her students to be able to take advantage of the positive
network externalities associated with Delaware incorporation. 3' Similarly,
the fact that a large number of firms are already incorporated in Delaware
increases the likelihood that that an investor or lawyer will gain familiarity
with Delaware simply through practice. 32 In this respect, familiarity is at
least to some extent derivative of learning and network effects. 33 In the
current project, we do not address why Delaware became the lingua franca
for corporate law. Rather, our claim here is that widespread investor and
lawyer familiarity with Delaware law has an independent effect on choice
of domicile apart from any network benefits associated with Delaware
incorporation.
The following numeric example illustrates the impact of investor
familiarity on choice of domicile. We use this example to clarify our
distinction between investor familiarity and network and learning effects.
B. Numeric Example: Familiarity Versus Network Externalities
Consider an entrepreneur seeking external financing for a new business
(Startup) located in Virginia. Startup will be structured as a corporate
entity. To attract financing, Startup must provide terms, including state.
of domicile, acceptable to an investor. Consistent with numerous empirical
will incorporate either in its home state of
studies, we assume that Startup
34
Virginia or in Delaware.
Indeed, Startup's choice of domicile can be understood as a term in the
financing contract. Investors sometimes explicitly bargain over legal
domicile by including it in the financing term sheet negotiated with the

31.

See id. at 840, 851.

32.

See McDonnell, supra note 1, at 704; Broughman, Ibrahim & Fried, supra note

13, at 866-67.
33. See Broughman, Fried & Ibrahim, supra note 13, at 867.
34. Virtually all firms, public and private, incorporate in either their home state or
in Delaware. See Bebehuk & Hamdani, supra note 4, at 578; Broughman, Ibrahim &
Fried, supra note 13, at 872; Daines, supra note 17, at 1562; Jens Dammann & Matthias
Schiindeln, The IncorporationChoices of PrivatelyHeld Corporations,27 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 79, 79 (2011).

entrepreneur,3 5 or by requesting that the firm reincorporate to a jurisdiction
that is more acceptable to the investor.36 Even if domicile is not explicitly
bargained over, perhaps because the entrepreneur incorporated the business
prior to financing, the entrepreneur is likely to consider the interests of
prospective investors when choosing where to incorporate.
Since it arises out of a voluntary contract, the parties have an incentive
to choose the body of corporate law which provides the greatest net
benefit to all contracting parties. 37 Proponents of the race-to-the-top view
may argue this "contractarian" understanding of choice of domicile reinforces
the view that Delaware's success is due to the high quality of its substantive
law. 38 Everything else equal, we agree the higher quality corporate law is
more likely to be selected. It should be noted, however, that the "net
benefit" of a given body of corporate law is not based solely on the quality
of the substantive law, but also includes other factors such as: (i) the
franchise tax charged by the state, (ii) the investors' relative familiarity
with the law, and (iii) network externalities created by other firms domiciling
39
in the state.
Putting this altogether suggests the entrepreneur and prospective
investors will select the body of corporate law that maximizes the following
equation:
Net benefit = law quality -franchise tax - unfamiliaritycost + network ext. + e

"Unfamiliarity cost" represents the aggregate cost for all contract
parties, including investors, to adequately inform themselves regarding
the relevant state's corporate law. If parties are already familiar with the
state's corporate law, then unfamiliarity cost equals zero. "Network
externalities" represents various benefits that arise based on the number
of other firms incorporated in the state. The term "e" is a random error
term that is meant to capture idiosyncratic reasons parties sometimes choose
one state over another. This error term effectively transforms the above
equation into a predicted likelihood that Delaware, as opposed to the home

35.

To illustrate, the state of incorporation is one of the first terms listed in the

National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) model term sheet. Model Legal Documents,
Term Sheet, NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL Ass'N, http://nvca.org/resources/model-legaldocuments/ [http://perma.cc/WJ4M-Y393] (last visited May 20, 2015).

36. Reincorporation is fairly inexpensive for a small, private firm. It is more costly
for larger businesses and for firms that have already gone public. See, e.g., Bernard S.
Black, Is CorporateLaw Trivial? A Politicaland Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV.
542, 558, 586-87 (1990).
37. See Klausner, supra note 20, at 758.
38. See Winter, supra note 8, at 256, 290; Romano, Law as a Product,supra note

8, at 279-81.
39.

See Broughman, Ibrahim & Fried, supra note 13, at 867-68, 880.
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state, will be selected as the state of incorporation. Thus, even if all defined
terms in the above equation suggest that Delaware will provide higher net
benefit for a particular firm, the error term implies that there is still some
chance that the firm may nonetheless domicile in its home state.
To give some content to unfamiliarity cost, we make three foundational
assumptions. First, we assume each investor is familiar, either directly or
through their legal counsel,4" with the investor's home-state corporate law.
Given the prevalence of home-state incorporation for small businesses, 4
local investors and their legal counsel will likely have at least some
experience with the corporate law of their home state. This is especially
true if, as is typically the case, the investor is represented by an in-state
attorney.42 Lawyers have several avenues for becoming familiar with
their home-state law. In chronological order, lawyers become familiar
with home-state law through some combination of the following: 1) they
studied home-state corporate law in law school-if they attended an instate school; 2) they passed the home state bar exam, which tests corporate
law; and 3) they have practical experience counseling clients on homestate law. For all of these reasons, we believe business parties located in
a particular state will be familiar with that state's corporate law.
Our second foundational assumption is investors and their lawyers are
familiar with Delaware corporate law. The majority of publicly traded
firms are incorporated in Delaware,4 3 and consequently investors are likely
to have had experience investing in Delaware firms. Indeed, in a recent

40. Lawyers are likely to handle legal issues associated with an equity investment,
and thus an investor's lawyer may be more involved in negotiating the state of incorporation
issue than the investor itself. See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, The Persistenceof Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the
Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 801, 840 (1994) (finding that a
debtor's choice of Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy is clearly influenced by her attorney's
preference). By talking to lawyers at national law firms who counsel VCs, we found that

the sophisticated VCs were as involved in the domicile decision as the lawyers. It stands
to reason that the non-sophisticated VCs may defer to their attorneys more, although we
have no proof of this.

41.
See Dammann & Schundeln, supra note 28, at 84.
42.
In connection with our empirical paper, we interviewed several VCs about their
choice of attorney in start-up financing matters. We asked them whether they used an instate and out-of-state attorney, and from those who responded, the answer was unanimously instate attorney. Admittedly this is a small sample size, less than ten VCs, but nonetheless
offers support for the assumption that VCs use in-state attorneys to counsel them in connection
with start-up financings.

43.

See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 4, at 572.

survey, lawyers involved in initial public offerings (IPOs) overwhelmingly
report that one benefit of Delaware relative to the issuer's home-state
corporate law is that investors are familiar with Delaware law.44 Equally
importantly, lawyers in all states become familiar with Delaware law.
Regardless of school attended, most American law students study Delaware
corporate law in law school.45 Furthermore, it is rational for a business
lawyer to focus on Delaware law.4 6 As Rob Daimes observes, business
"lawyers ...are likely to know Delaware law. Focusing on one national
standard allows them to economize on the need to keep up to date with
developments in multiple jurisdictions. 4 7
Our third foundational assumption is that investors and their lawyers
are less likely to be familiar with the corporate law of a third state; in other
words, one that is neither the investor's home state nor Delaware. Unless
the lawyers went to law school in the third state, they likely did not learn
the third state's law in school.48 Additionally, unless they passed the bar
in the third state, which is unlikely if not routinely practicing there, they
did not learn the state's corporate law for a bar exam. And if they do not
regularly practice or invest in that state, they did not gain comfort with
that state's law through experience. This unfamiliarity with third state
law suggests that the value of Delaware incorporation, as a lingua franca,
increases when a firm receives financing from out-of-state investors.49
Returning to our numeric example, we can now model unfamiliarity
cost Because all parties are expected to be familiar with Delaware corporate
law, if Startup incorporates in Delaware unfamiliarity cost equals zero.

44.

Carney, Shepherd & Bailey, supra note 11, at 143 (reporting that 92% of

underwriters' lawyers, and 83% of issuers' lawyers, agreed with the statement: "Delaware
is a better place than my state to incorporate for public companies because investors are
more familiar with Delaware law").
45. Delaware corporate law is the cornerstone of public corporation legal study.
See Daines, supra note 17, at 1581 ("Some lawyers also know Delaware law, as it is
something of a national standard, frequently taught in law schools. In particular, lawyers
specializing in large, complicated transactions,... or who have a multistate practice, are
likely to know Delaware law.").
46. McDonnell, supra note 1,at 704 ("Corporate lawyers across the country tend
to be familiar with Delaware because of the state's prominence. They can thus provide
advice on Delaware law more cheaply, having to do less research.").
47. Daines, supra note 17, at 1581.
48.
Although if the corporate law course contrasted Delaware with the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA), and the state is an MBCA-adopting state, then the
lawyers have at least some education in MBCA, and thus the third state's, law.
49. See Carney, Shepherd & Bailey, supra note 11, at 125 ("Delaware is chosen
because of the ignorance of investors. Because so many corporations are incorporated in
Delaware-especially most large ones-many investors are familiar only with Delaware
corporate law and with businesses that are incorporated there. Even if other states' laws
are superior, investors prefer incorporation in familiar Delaware.").
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By contrast if Startup incorporates in its home state, this will introduce
transaction costs for each out-of-state investor financing the firm.
Consequently, if Startup is incorporated in Virginia, out-of-state investors
may have trouble evaluating the financing contract and will likely demand
a lower price per share to compensate for the cost of learning Virginia law.
That is, their lawyers are likely to charge higher legal fees to negotiate a deal
in an unfamiliar body of law. To reflect this concern, we assume that if
or
Startup incorporates in Virginia it will face additional transaction,
50
investor.
out-of-state
each
for
two
to
equal
costs
unfamiliarity,
Now we can complete the net benefit equation by providing values for
law quality,franchise tax, and network externalities. The values suggested
below are merely for illustrative purposes. Importantly, our analysis does
not depend on the magnitude of these costs and benefits, these of course
could be debated. All that matters for purposes of our lingua franca
hypothesis is that unfamiliarity cost increases with the number of out-ofstate investors, and that this cost is sufficiently large that it may cause
some firms which otherwise may have domiciled in their home state to
instead select Delaware.
To illustrate this point assume that law quality equals eighteen for
Delaware and equals twenty for Virginia. In other words, assume for
argument's sake that Virginia offers higher quality corporate law than
Delaware. Even with this assumption, the analysis below suggests that some
firms may rationally choose to incorporate in Delaware for familiarity
reasons.
Delaware has the highest franchise tax fees among U.S. states.5" This
cost differential is even greater for a firm headquartered outside Delaware
choosing between Delaware and home-state domicile. In such case, if the
firm incorporates in Delaware, in addition to paying Delaware franchise
tax, the firm will also have to pay a foreign qualification fee to its home
state and it will have to appoint an agent for service of process in Delaware.
To capture this effect we assume that Delaware's franchise tax lowers net
benefit by five, while Virginia's franchise tax only lowers net benefit by
one.

50. Our analysis does not depend on the magnitude of this cost. What matters is
that the presence of an unfamiliarity cost decreases net benefit.
51.

Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discriminationin the Marketfor Corporate

Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1218-25 (2001) (noting that especially for large publicly
held firms, Delaware corporations pay higher franchise taxes).

Finally, we consider network externalities, both the network effects and
learning effects previously discussed.52 In our example, Delaware has a
clear advantage. More than half of all publicly held businesses domicile
in Delaware. This large network of Delaware firms reduces uncertainty
in the interpretation of Delaware law and provides Startup with more case
law-a large network means that more cases are litigated-and better
availability of legal services in the future, particularly when compared to
Virginia, where the incorporation network is considerably smaller. We
assume Startup would receive a network externality benefit equal to four
by incorporating in Delaware, and a benefit equal to one if it were to
incorporate in Virginia.
TABLE 1: STARTUP SCENARIOS

# ofout
of state state

invstrs

of inc.
DE
Home
DE
Home
DE
Home
DE
Home
DE
Home

quality franchise

of law
18
20
18
20
18
20
18
20
18
20

tax
-5
-1
-5
-1
-5
-1
-5
-1
-5
-1

unfamiliarity

network

net

cost
0
0
0
-2
0
-4
0
-6
0
-8

extrnlity
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1

benefit
17
20
17
18
17
16
17
14
17
12

Table 1 summarizes the above costs and benefit considerations for
Startup. The first column lists the number of out-of-state investors
financing Startup. The last column compares the net benefit of Delaware
domicile to home-state domicile depending on the number of out-of-state
investors. Each additional out-of-state investor decreases the net benefit
of home-state domicile, but has no effect on the benefit provided by
Delaware law. To illustrate, if Startup is financed entirely by in-state
parties, it will likely incorporate in its home state (because 20 > 17). But
if Startup receives financing from two or more out-of-state investors, it
will likely switch to Delaware (because 16 < 17). Note that the number
of in-state investors has no effect on the decision, since they are assumed
to be equally familiar with both their home-state and Delaware law. By
52.

Id. at 1210.
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contrast, the number of out-of-state investors matters greatly, because
each lowers the net benefit of home-state domicile by two.
To be sure, we do not mean to imply that all firms with two or more
out-of-state investors will domicile in Delaware, nor do we mean to
suggest that no firms with less out-of-state investors will choose Delaware.
There are certainly idiosyncratic reasons, captured by our error term 6,
that may cause a specific firm to favor its home state over Delaware or
vice versa. Rather, our point is simply that the relative benefit of Delaware
as compared to home-state domicile increases with the number of out-ofstate investors, and thus we would expect greater likelihood of Delaware
domicile as the number of out-of-state parties financing a firm increases.
C. Hypotheses
The above example illustrates several points. First, even though
Delaware charges higher franchise tax fees and Delaware law is assumed
to be of lower quality than Virginia, 53 Delaware may nonetheless provide
a greater net benefit because these costs are counterbalanced by (i) outof-state investors' unfamiliarity with Virginia law, and (ii) large positive
network externalities associated with Delaware domicile.
Second, network benefits and widespread familiarity with Delaware
law may help explain why the state can charge high franchise tax fees. In
contrast to some authors who implicitly assume that Delaware's high
franchise tax fees are evidence of its high-quality law,54 our analysis suggests
that network externalities and widespread legal familiarity give Delaware
a type of monopoly power, allowing it to charge higher franchise tax fees
55
than the inherent quality of its law might suggest.

53. Note if we instead assume that Delaware provides the same quality (or better)
law than Virginia, the only change is that it takes less out-of-state investors to cause a firm
to switch to Delaware. The unfamiliarity cost associated with home-state domicile
remains a factor pushing firms toward Delaware and away from home-state domicile.
Idiosyncratic reasons (e) may still cause some firms to domicile in their home state, even
if Delaware's quality of law were set sufficiently high that the numeric example would
suggest that Delaware has a higher expected net benefit than Virginia even absent out-ofstate investors. The likelihood of Delaware domicile still increases relative to Virginia
with the number of out of state investors.
54.
Romano, supra note 8, at 231 (finding a correlation between the percentage of
state franchise tax revenue to a state's total revenue and the state's legal innovativeness).
55. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 41, at 1207 ("We argue that Delaware exploits
its market power through price discrimination. Price discrimination involves charging

Third, the numeric example also helps explain the bimodal choice in
selecting state of incorporation. If a business were to select anything other
than (i) Delaware or (ii) home state domicile, the parties would likely
encounter even larger unfamiliarity costs. Domiciling in a third state would
mean that all parties, both in state and out, would likely be unfamiliar with
the relevant law.
Fourth, the above example illustrates that familiarity is conceptually
distinct from network benefits. The unfamiliarity cost term is based on
the number of out-of-state investors financing Startup, while the network
externality term is based on the total number of firms incorporated in the
relevant state. Even if there are no out-of-state investors, and all parties
are perfectly familiar with home-state law (in other words, unfamiliarity
cost equals zero), Delaware corporate law still provides greater network
benefits than the home state. By incorporating in Delaware, Startup would
have access to more case law, better legal services, and could take advantage
of drafting efficiencies from past use of Delaware law. These network
benefits arise regardless of the familiarity of the specific investors providing
financing.
Putting this altogether, our analysis yields testable predictions regarding
investor familiarity and network externalities. Our investor familiarity
hypothesis is as follows: the likelihood that a firm will incorporate in
Delaware increases with the number of out-of-state investors financing the
firm. The more out-of-state investors, the more likely such investors share
in common only a familiarity with Delaware corporate law, as opposed to
home-state law or third-state law. In short, Delaware law is needed as a
lingua franca that investors from various states all "speak," since they do
not all speak home-state, or third-state, law.
Our hypothesis should be especially true if the out-of-state investors
have not previously financed a firm incorporated in Startup's home state.
Investors who have previously financed a business incorporated in a third
state, one that is neither the business party's home state nor Delaware,
may gain some familiarity with that third state's law through their past
experience. To illustrate, an investor from Texas may have previously
financed a firm incorporated in California. In doing so, the investor may
have learned a bit about California corporate law causing him to be more
familiar with California than a typical out-of-state party. To be sure, the
Texas investor may not be as familiar with California law as a party
actually located in California, but he may have become sufficiently comfortable
with California law that he is somewhat more willing to finance another

different prices to different consumers according to their willingness to pay in order to
increase profits.").
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firm domiciled in California in the future. To use our language metaphor,
the investor may have working knowledge of California corporate law but
not native-level fluency. This form of partial fluency suggests that some
out-of-state investors-those with past exposure to the home-state lawmay have less need for Delaware to serve as a lingua franca. Thus we can
restate our lingua-franca hypothesis: All else being equal, the likelihood
that a firm will incorporate in-or reincorporate in-Delaware as opposed
to its home state increases with the number of out-of-state investors
financing the firm, especially if such out-of-state investors have no past
experience working with the firm's home-state corporate law.
Although our Article is focused on investor familiarity as a new
explanation for Delaware's continued success in attracting corporate charters,
our analysis also suggests a straightforward network effects hypothesis:
All else being equal, the likelihood that a firm will incorporate in Delaware
as opposed to its home state decreases with the total number of other firms
incorporated in the firm's home-state. If the home-state also has a large
network of incorporations, then the network benefit associated with Delaware
because the home state also provides a
will be somewhat less critical,
56
meaningful network benefit.
Importantly, our familiarity and network externality hypotheses run
orthogonal to the leading explanation for Delaware's dominance to dateits substantive quality. Broadly this includes the merits and predictability
of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) and its substantial
case law,57 the flexibility of that law,58 and the expertise of the Delaware

56.

The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) also provides a type of network

benefit to the states that adopt it. By incorporating in a state that has adopted the MBCA,
a firm can take advantage of a larger body of case law interpreting the MBCA code. See
McDonnell, supra note 1,at 731 ("The MBCA makes it easier for states with limited
resources and few corporations to update their corporate laws, a hard technical task. It
thereby puts some more pressure on Delaware to improve its laws, as other states look
more attractive than they would without the MBCA.").
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 41, at 1212 ("Delaware boasts a well-developed
57.
corporate case law. Because many corporate disputes arise under Delaware law,
Delaware's case law is more developed than the case law of other states.").
58
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supranote 8, at 15 (most DGCL statutory provisions
are only default provisions that can be overridden in corporate charters and bylaws);
William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope of Delaware CorporateLaw, 25 DEL. J. CORP.

L. 70, 71 (2000) (the DGCL is "kept evergreen by careful annual amendments," continuously
reflecting "its original commitment to private ordering, flexibility, predictability and fairness");
Omari Scott Simons, Brandingthe Small Wonder: Delaware'sDominance andthe Market

Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court to hand down new decisions.59
We attempt to test both Delaware's familiarity and, separately, its substantive
virtues, to determine their relative importance in explaining Delaware's
continued success in attracting incorporations.
III. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR FAMILIARITY

We now use data from our prior empirical study to test the familiarity
and network externality hypotheses. 60 6Data
are from 1850 U.S. start-up
1
firms financed by venture capital (VC).

VC-backed start-ups provide a desirable empirical setting, as they
exhibit heterogeneity regarding investor location. 62 Some VC-backed
start-ups receive out-of-state financing, while others are funded primarily
by in-state investors. Furthermore, because VC-backed start-ups are financed
in stages, 63 there is also heterogeneity over time in the mix of in-state and
out-of-state investors. For example, an early VC round may include only
in-state investors, but in a subsequent round the same firm may receive
funding from out-of-state VC investors. This variation allows us to test
the importance of investor familiarity as a determinant of incorporation
choice in our regression analysis.
It is difficult to think of another type of firm that exhibits the sufficient
in-state versus out-of-state investor heterogeneity necessary to test a

for CorporateLaw, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1159 n. 140 (2008) (crediting the "flexibility
of the Delaware Model" as "leav[ing] room for economically useful innovation and creativity").
59. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 41, at 1212 (noting that the quality of its courts is
"where Delaware really shines" and observing that "[m]embers of the [Chancery] court...
have ample opportunity to develop expertise on matters of Delaware corporate law and
have developed a national reputation for handling cases expeditiously"); McDonnell,
supra note 1, at 703 ("[Delaware courts "] are able to decide cases quickly and in a wellconsidered way.").
60. See generally Broughman, Fried & Ibrahim, supra note 13.
61.
See id.at 871. Data were collected primarily from the VentureXpert database
maintained by Thomson Financial to collect our data. For our parameters, we chose startups that received their first VC financing round during the three-year period from January
1, 2000, to December 31, 2002. Due to staged financing, choosing this early timeframe
for the initial VC round gives the start-up time to obtain follow-on rounds in subsequent
years before we collected our data. Importantly, while a start-up may begin by incorporating
in one state, its domicile may be changed mid-stream by reincorporating into another state,
often in connection with a new VC round. There may be selection bias in our timeframe
given the dot.com bust of the late 1990s, but we hoped to capture start-ups initially funded
after the bust and with sufficient time to reincorporate before we collected data. For more
details on how the dataset was put together see our earlier paper. Id.at 871-72.
62. Id. at 868.
63 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Str6mberg, FinancialContracting Theory Meets
the Real World: An EmpiricalAnalysisof Venture CapitalContracts,70 REV. ECON. STUD.
281, 304 (2003) (discussing staged financing of VC-backed start-ups).
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familiarity hypothesis. Public corporations, almost by definition, are
largely owned by out-of-state investors. Conversely, closely-held lifestyle
firms are mostly owned by in-state investors. 64 In fact, the difficulty of
testing the familiarity hypothesis among non-VC-backed start-ups may
explain its absence in the otherwise voluminous incorporations literature.
A. Summary of Dataset
Our sample, collected from VentureXpert, consists of U.S.-based startups that received their first VC financing round during the three-year
period from January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2002, and received at least
$5 million in total VC financing. 65 We then used Lexis-Nexis public records
data and the Delaware Secretary of State's webpage to match each startsecretary of
up in our sample with incorporation records from the 6relevant
7
state. 66 This gave us a sample of 1850 start-up firms.
These 1850 start-ups each received, on average, $36.8 million in VC
financing-over 3.6 rounds of financing. Emphasizing the risk inherent
in start-up firms, approximately one third of the firms in our sample had
achieved a successful exit by 2008, either via an IPO or a merger &
acquisition (M&A) sale. The remaining sample firms have either gone
out of business or are active. Readers interested in more background on
the firms in our database should see the original empirical paper.68

Jens Dammann & Matthias Schfindeln, Where Are Limited Liability Companies
64.
Formed? An EmpiricalAnalysis, 55 J. L. & ECON. 741, 743 (2012); Dammann & Schiindeln,
supra note 28, at 84-85.
65.
See Broughman, Fried & Ibrahim, supra note 13, at 871-72.
66.
Broughman, Fried & Ibrahim, supra note 13, at 872 n.8 ("Lexis-Nexis public

records data includes domicile data (via secretary-of-state filings) for locally domiciled
firms of all states except Delaware. Information about Delaware domicile was obtained
from (a) doing-business forms filed by Delaware-domiciled firms in their home states and
(b) the Delaware's Secretary of State webpage (https://delecorp.delaware.gov/tin/GIName
Search.jsp)."). Corporate law is more important to us than other business associations law
such as limited liability company law, because VC-backed start-ups are generally organized as
corporations. See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups, 41 UCLA

L. REV. 1737, 1739-40 (1994); Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring
Venture CapitalStart-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137, 137 (2003).
67.
Broughman, Fried & Ibrahim, supra note 13, at 871-72.
68.
See generally id

B. Results: State ofIncorporation

First, we found that the race for VC-backed start-up charters is a
"bimodal" race between Delaware and the start-up's home state.69 Only
a small percentage of start-ups in our sample chose to incorporate or
reincorporate in a state that was not either Delaware or the start-up's home
state.7 0 This result supports the prior literature claiming that national
competition among states for incorporations is largely a myth.7
Second, in this bimodal race, Delaware beats the home state handily.
Almost sixty-eight percent (67.8%) of start-ups chose Delaware as their
initial state of incorporation, versus twenty-nine percent (28.7%) who
chose their home state. Reincorporation figures are even more striking.
A total of 212 firms in our sample changed legal domicile by reincorporating
in connection with a new round of financing. When reincorporation occurs
it is almost always into Delaware and away from the firm's home state or
another third state. Indeed, ninety-five percent of reincorporations-205
out of 212-in our sample were in Delaware. 72 When incorporations and
reincorporations are combined to tally final state of domicile, 1457 startups-79% of the sample-chose Delaware. The particulars of these
results are detailed in Table 2 below.
TABLE 2: STATE OF INCORPORATION (N = 1850)

Original Inc.
Delaware
Home State
Other State

Count
1254
531
65

(%)
(67.8)
(28.7)
(3.5)

Final Inc.
Count
1457
359
34

(%)
(78.8)
(19.4)
(1.8)

Percent
Change
+11.0%
-9.3%
-1.7%

Third, out-of-state investors have more impact on choice of domicile
than in-state investors. As seen in Tables 3 and 4 below, the likelihood of
Delaware incorporation increases with the number of out-of-state VC
investors. For example, in the first round [Table 3], firms receiving
exclusively in-state financing incorporate in Delaware with 64% to 71%
likelihood, compared to 72% to 82% for firms that received first round
financing from two out-of-state investors. The effect is even more pronounced

69.
This confirms Rob Daines' findings in his study of IPO firms. Daines, supra
note 17, at 1562.
70.
The third-state total domicile percentage was 1.8%. See infra Table 2.
71.
See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 3, at 748.
72. See Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 8, at 226 (explaining that a large
percentage of reincorporations go to Delaware).
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in later round financing where "[m]oving from one out-of-state investor
to four or more out-of-state investors is associated with an approximate
17% increase in the probability of Delaware incorporation. ' 73 Adding
out-of-state VCs suggests greater need for a lingua franca, and thus for
Delaware corporate law. This result is consistent with our familiarity
hypothesis.
TABLE

3: DELAWARE

INCORPORATION IN FIRST-ROUND FINANCING

Number of Out-of-State Investors

73.4%

78.7%

93.1%

E

63.6%

73.3%

82.0%

84.2%

zc

68.9%

81.2%

72.2%

87.5%

70.8%

79.5%

72.8%

100%

Percent Delaware Incorporation

73.

Broughman, Fried & Ibrahim, supra note 13, at 874.

TABLE 4: DELAWARE INCORPORATION IN FOLLOW-ON
ROUND FINANCING

Number of Out-of-State Investors
0
0

1

2

3

4+

77.6%

81.9%

79.8%

92.2%

1

67.2%

72.1%

73.8%

82.6%

92.0%

2

65.8%

71.1%

86.2%

83.8%

92.3%

3

69.8%

79.2%

80.8%

81.5%

93.1%

4+

66.0%

77.8%

77.6%

81.5%

94.4%

0

Zr

Percent Delaware Incorporation
By contrast, the number of in-state investors has little effect on choice
of domicile. For example, in later round financing going from one to four
or more in-state investors only increases the likelihood of Delaware
incorporation by approximately 2%. Out-of-state VCs need Delaware because
they are unfamiliar with home state law, whereas in-state investors have no
similar need to incorporate in Delaware. In-state VCs are already familiar
with both home-state law and with Delaware. Absent other considerations,
in-state investors appear to be largely indifferent between Delaware and
home-state law.74
C. Results: Investor Familiarityand Network Externalities

To test the familiarity and network externality hypotheses we estimate
the likelihood of Delaware incorporation at the first round of VC financing:
Delaware = a

74.

+ fli*[FamiliarityVariables]+ flj*[Network Ext.

See Tables 3 and 4.

Variables] +/I*X+ e

[VOL.

Delaware'sFamiliarity

52: 273, 2015]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In this equation fli and ,j are coefficient estimates for variables used to
measure investor familiarity and network externalities; X is a vector of
other included control variables; and e is the error term. Delawareequals
one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware and zero otherwise.
For investor familiarity, our primary explanatory variable is Out-ofState Investors. We predict that the likelihood of Delaware incorporation
will increase with the number of out-of-state investors. Next we define
Local Exposure as the number of out-of-state investors who have
previously financed a firm incorporated in the start-up's home state. Such
investors have at least some familiarity with the local dialect-home-state
law-and thus we predict that the likelihood of Delaware incorporation
will decrease with local exposure.
As stated, network externalities do not depend on the specific investors
providing financing, but rather on the total number of other firms
incorporated in the state. To operationalize this, we define State Inc. Count
as the total number of publicly held firms incorporated in the start-up's
home state, and we predict that the likelihood of Delaware incorporation
will decrease with State Inc. Count. Finally, we also record whether the
start-up is located in a state that has adopted, at least in part, the Model
Business Corporation Act (MBCA state). The MBCA provides a type of
network benefit. By incorporating in a state that has adopted the MBCA,
a firn can take advantage of a larger body of case law interpreting the MBCA
code, 75 and thus we would expect less demand for Delaware if the startup's home state has adopted the MBCA.
We also control for various firm-level and state-level variables that may
affect a start-up's state of incorporation. The Appendix at the end of this
Article defines all variables used in the regression analysis. Table 5 presents
regression results, reporting logit marginal effects estimated with all variables
at their mean values.
TABLE

5: STATE

OF INCORPORATION AT THE FIRST

ROUND OF VC FINANCING

This table reports marginal effects based on logit estimates evaluated at
the mean of each variable. All variables are defined as of the first round
of VC financing. The dependent variable is Delaware,which equals one
if the firm was incorporated in Delaware, and zero otherwise. All

75.

See McDonnell, supra note 1, at 731.

explanatory variables are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors, clustered
at the state level and calculated via the delta-method, are reported in
parentheses to the right of each coefficient estimate. We use a two-sided
test for statistical significance (* = 10% and ** = 1% significance).
Logit Marginal Effects
(Dependent Variable = Delaware)
Model 1
Model 2
Familiarity Variables
Out-of-State Investors
Local Exposure
Network Ext.
Variables
State Inc. Count
MBCA state
Other Control
Variables
In-State Investors
Investment ($M4)
VCReputation
JudicialQuality
Flexibility
FranchiseTax
West of Mississippi
Sector Dummies
Year Dummies
Observations
Pseudo R-squared

.0872**
-.0594*

(.010)
(.033)

.0812**
-.0433

(.011)
(.029)

.0003
.0382

(.001)
(.098)

-.0004
.0169

(.001)
(.084)

.0127
.0018
-.0026**

(.011)
(.001)
(.001)

(.009)
(.001)
(.001)
(.134)
(.056)
(.000)
(.061)

Yes
Yes

.0166*
.0016
-.0028**
-. 1263
-.0646
.0000
-. 1715*
Yes
Yes

1789
.063

1789
.083

1. FindingsRelated to Investor Familiarity
As shown in this new regression, Table 5, which was not included in
our prior study, we find strong support for the familiarity hypothesis. In
both Model 1 and Model 2 we find that each additional out-of-state
investor increases the likelihood of Delaware incorporation by approximately
eight to nine percentage points. This result is significant at the one percent
level. We also find that when an out-of-state VC has previously invested
in a home-state start-up, specifically, where Local Exposure equals one,
the VC is more likely to accept future incorporations in that home state
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over Delaware. These results show that once an out-of-state VC becomes
familiar with a home state's law, it is more likely to use that law again in
the future-this is exactly what our familiarity hypothesis predicts.
Beyond statistical significance, note that the magnitude of the familiarity
effect is large. Most start-up firns incorporate in Delaware regardless if
they receive out-of-state financing. For example, holding all other variables
at their mean value, we find that firms with zero out-of-state investors still
choose Delaware at their first round of financing with approximately 68%
probability. However, if we increase the number of out-of-state investors
from zero to two, the likelihood of Delaware incorporation rises to
approximately 82% and the likelihood of home-state domicile nearly falls
in half-from 32% to 18%.
Our finding regarding the importance of investor familiarity is robust to
alternative econometric specifications and does not appear to be driven by
unobserved heterogeneity, specifically, endogenous selection of firms that
receive in-state versus out-of-state financing. In our prior study, we
considered two identification strategies to address potential endogeneity
concerns. First, we took advantage of the longitudinal variation in our
data to see if the arrival of out-of-state investors in a follow-on round of
financing caused firms originally incorporated in their home states to
reincorporate in Delaware. 76 Using a first differences regression approachdesigned to eliminate bias due to unobserved traits of each firm-we found
that each additional out-of-state investor had a statistically significant
impact on reincorporation, increasing the likelihood of reincorporation
into Delaware by approximately four to five percentage points. Second,
we used a VC fixed-effect regression model to isolate variation within
each VC's portfolio of investments. 77 We found, consistent with familiarity,
that a given VC is more likely to choose Delaware domicile when investing
out-of-state than when the same VC invests in its home state.78 Collectively,
these findings from our prior study provide further support for the familiarity
hypothesis. We refer interested readers to that article for further details.

76.
77.
78.

Broughman, Fried & Ibrahim, supra note 13, at 884-86.
Id.
Id. at 869.

2. FindingsRelated to Network Externalitiesand
Substantive Law Quality
By contrast, we do not find a statistically significant result for network
externalities. The coefficient estimates reported in Table 5 for both State
Inc. Count and MBCA State are small in magnitude and insignificant. The
fact that we control for network externalities in these regressions reaffirms
our view that investor familiarity is an independent consideration causing
firms to migrate to Delaware.
This does not, however, mean network externalities are irrelevant.
There are at least two reasons that network externalities may still have an
important impact on choice of domicile and do not show up in our regression
results. First, as we have discussed,7 9 familiarity is likely derivative of
network effects at least in an historic sense. So, it may be that network
effects originally caused investors and lawyers to become familiar with
Delaware, but today familiarity appears to have an independent effect on
choice of domicile.
Second, the regression analysis above only compares the relative network
effect associated with states other than Delaware. Technically, the variable
State Inc. Count looks at the number of publicly held firms incorporated
in the start-up's home state. In our sample, however, there are no firms
headquartered in Delaware, and consequently we are left comparing the
network value of non-Delaware states. Put another way, our results suggest
that the fact that more publicly held firms are incorporated in New York
than, Virginia for example, does not give New York a significant network
advantage relative to Virginia. It may be that no network other than Delaware
is great enough to make any real difference. However, as with network
externalities, although it was not a statistically significant result, we find
that states with a high-quality judiciary and more flexible corporate law
are somewhat more likely to retain their in-state start-ups. 80
These results
8
are consistent with Marcel Kahan's study of public firms. '
The only other variables with statistically significant effects on incorporation
choice are VC reputation and West of the Mississippi. 82 We find that start79.

See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.

80. The lack of statistical significance here may be due to the fact that we cluster
our standard errors at the state level, making it more difficult to find significant results for
such state-level variables.
81.
Marcel Kahan, The Demandfor CorporateLaw: Statutory Flexibility,Judicial
Quality, or Takeover Protection?,22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340, 341 (2006).

82. Although not reflected in this Table, in our other paper we found that VCs
represented by national law firms are more likely to have the start-ups they fund
incorporated in Delaware. This is consistent with Daines's prior work. Daines, supra note

17, at 1604. This result does not necessarily go against a familiarity explanation, however.
For national law firms, Delaware may be the only corporate law familiar to all the firm's
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ups financed by older, more reputable VC firms are less likely to incorporate
in Delaware, and start-ups headquartered west of the Mississippi River are
also less likely to incorporate in Delaware. This does not mean that other
explanations for incorporation choice are not meaningful or accurate.
This issue is addressed further in Part III, Section 3 below.
3. Lingua Francaor Signaling?
Finally, it could be that business parties are choosing Delaware law not
because it serves as a lingua franca, but to signal something about the
start-up. While familiarity gets at a party's internalreasons for choosing
Delaware because they know it, signaling would look at the party's
external reasons for choosing Delaware because others know it. A party
might favor Delaware incorporation because it brands the start-up as highquality. In this sense, signaling is akin to network externalities. Signaling
and network externalities both focus on other users. But while network
externalities are concerned with other firms in the network, signaling is
concerned with the investors in those firms.
While we could not determine a suitable way to test a signaling
hypothesis using our data, it is certainly possible that parties chose Delaware
in an attempt to signal their corporate quality. However, as a theoretical
matter, several factors cut against a signaling explanation for Delaware's
dominance. First, if signaling was the primary story, start-ups funded by
mostly in-state VCs would mostly need that signal to combat their regionalness.
Yet these start-ups are more likely to choose home-state domicile than
Delaware domicile. Second, Michal Barzuza suggests that Delaware law,
which is neither the laxest or strictest corporate law, provides at best a
"noisy" signal to investors, not a strong, positive one. 83 Third, a signal
must be costly to be effective, and Delaware incorporation is not significantly
costly for private firms due to the way franchise taxes are calculated

attorneys, who hail from multiple offices in different states. Conversely, regional firms
have less heterogeneity in lawyer location, and thus all of their lawyers are more likely to
know local law. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise ofNevada as a Liability-

Free Jurisdiction,98 VA. L. REV. 935, 976 (2012) ("Local lawyers tend to advise the firms
they represent to incorporate in their home states. National firms, on the other hand, tend
to recommend incorporation in Delaware."); McDonnell, supra note 1, at 712 (it may be
"that lawyers in smaller firms servicing smaller businesses are less familiar with Delaware
and more familiar with local law")
83.
Barzuza, supra note 67, at 968-70 (noting that in contrast to Delaware, Nevada's
corporate law provides a stronger signal of laxity).

there.84 Although Delaware franchise taxes are costly for public corporations,
they are smaller for private start-ups. 85 Finally, the entrepreneurship literature
suggests that there are better signals for start-up quality than legal domicile,
including patent portfolios and willingness to give the VCs preferred stock
as opposed to the entrepreneur's common stock.86
IV. IMPLICATIONS
We find that business parties choose Delaware corporate law for its
familiarity as much as for its quality. We do not suggest that the twofamiliarity and substantive virtues-are mutually exclusive. Delaware
law likely became familiar to parties due to its high quality, and thus more
frequent use. The same is true of network externalities. But familiarity
as an alternative, independent explanation of Delaware's dominance,
leads to interesting potential ramifications. In this Part we examine the
normative implications of our familiarity explanation, a topic left largely
unaddressed in our prior empirical paper.
A. Normative Implications of Delaware'sFamiliarity:Positives
1. Lowering Transaction Costs ofFinancing
The most important advantage of Delaware's familiarity is its ability to
lower transaction costs when investors fund start-ups. Delaware's advantage
in lowering transaction costs for public corporations has been observed by
Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar, who note that "[t]he extensiveness and
familiarity of Delaware case law reduces the cost of planning transactions
for Delaware corporations, obtaining legal advice for them, and assessing
their value."87 More in tune with our focus on firm financing, Klausner
observes that Delaware's superior ability to provide judicial interpretation
of legal terms may reduce a corporation's cost of capital. 8

84.
assesses
85.
in home

See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 41, at 1223, 1227 (finding that Delaware
minimal franchise taxes on non-public corporations, as low as $30 per year).
See id.Of course, incorporating in Delaware is more costly than incorporating
state, as previously discussed. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

86.
See Darian M. Ibrahim, Financingthe Next Silicon Valley, 87 WASH. U. L. REV.
717, 750 (2010) ("[P]rivate VCs look to a start-up's patent portfolio as a proxy for its
quality."); id. at 751-52 ("By selling preferred stock to private VCs while holding common
stock themselves, entrepreneurs signal their belief that the value of the start-up will exceed
the amount of the VC's preference.").
87.
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 725 (2002).
88.
Klausner, supra note 20, at 777 (Delaware's superior ability to judicially interpret
terms "may be reflected in a firm's cost of capital"). In scholarly work on contracting more
generally, Kahan and Klausner note that the benefits of using standard terms in contracts
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a. Reducing Legal Costs
While most start-up firms are unable to attract VC financing, 89 those
that do are under considerable pressure to keep the cost of legal representation
low. 9° If a start-up firm has to spend thirty thousand in legal fees to raise
only three million, the lawyers just took one percent of the investors'
expected retums. 91 For cash-strapped start-ups, spending precious cash on
research and development (R&D), is an
legal fees-as opposed to
92
unwelcome development.
Of course, the lawyers feel a competing pressure to design a sophisticated
private financing contract using preferred stock with complicated cash
flow contingencies. Doing sophisticated legal work, at a very low cost,
can be one of those difficult requests that clients make of lawyers. There
will be plenty of contingencies in the financing that will require the
lawyer's time and expertise. The body of law to govern the start-up should
generally not be one of them. Therefore, by choosing to incorporate in
Delaware, the lawyer has removed one source of uncertainty that could
require her time and has a better chance of accomplishing her dual
objectives-a high-quality legal product, yet at a low cost to the client.
b. Menu-Based Contracting
Another way to see how Delaware's familiarity reduces transaction93
costs is to consider Delaware law under the "menu" approach to contracting.

include efficiency, reduced uncertainty, and general understanding among "lawyers, other
professionals, and the investment community." Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719-20
(1997). The authors liken a commonly understood term to "the use of standard weights

and measures for physical products-they reduce the cost of comparison." Id. at 723 n.25.
89.
Ibrahim, supra note 12, at 1428 (noting that VCs fund only 1-3% of the
proposals they receive).
90.

Fred Wilson, A Challenge to Startup Lawyers, AVC BLOG (Mar. 23, 2011), http://

avc.com/2011/03/a-challenge-to-startup-lawyers/ [http://perma.cc/T54T-SP3C] (urging
start-up lawyers to do early round financing deals for $5,000 or less).
91.
See Bengtsston & Bernhardt, supra note 19, at 397. The investor's lawyer will
charge more to do legal work using an unfamiliar body of corporate law.
92.
See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence:
Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81 TEx. L. REV. 405, 430 n. 19 (2002) (asserting that
start-ups would prefer to dedicate their cash to R&D over legal fees).
93.
lan Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI L. REV. 3, 3 (2006); Yair Listokin, What
Do CorporateDefault Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination,6 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 279, 288 (2009).

Menus of contract choices lower transaction costs by providing parties
with bundled alternatives that work together without the parties having to
explicitly contract for them. For example, Delaware offers a traditional
corporation statute and a close corporations statute. 94 Due to its widespread
familiarity, Delaware's menu of choices resembles a McDonald's menu.
No matter where you are in the United States, you know the menu at
McDonald's. This makes ordering quicker, and perhaps, is what attracted
you to visit there to begin with. 95 By contrast, a third state's law offers
the equivalent of a local restaurant's menu, which is unfamiliar to anyone
from out-of-town.
Menus also reduce choices once you choose to eat at a restaurant. 96 The
97
menus offer bounded rationality to the parties' choices of options.
Pivoting back to corporate law, Delaware's section 102(b)(7) essentially
allows companies to choose between two standards of directors' monetary
98
liability for breach of fiduciary duty-gross negligence or bad faith.
Finally, menus lower transaction costs by offering a delegated third
party-in our case, the Delaware legislature-that can change outdated
rules in an efficient manner, rather than the parties having to revisit their
contracts and do this themselves.9 9 Delaware's well-known menu reduces
transaction costs, including legal fees, and thereby lowers a start-up's cost
of capital.
2. Reducing Asymmetric Information
Delaware's familiarity can also reduce contracting problems caused by
one party operating at an informational advantage. While investors may
be generally reluctant to negotiate an investment if they are unfamiliar
with the relevant body of corporate law, they may be especially concerned
if entrepreneurs incorporate in a state that the entrepreneurs, or their legal

94. See Listokin, supra note 78, at 288 (conceptualizing Delaware's anti-takeover
provisions as a menu option).
95.
Listokin has previously noted the tie between the menu idea and network
externalities. Id. at 285 ("Menus also create a focal point that engenders the formation of
a network effect, which also reduces transaction costs.").
96.
Listokin distinguishes these transaction costs-lowering benefits with the traditional
mandatory versus enabling statute discussion. Id. at 284 ("The difference in initial
transaction costs between opting in and opting out of a statute is minimal. Therefore, the
large difference in outcomes between companies incorporated in opt-in versus opt-out states is
inconsistent with the transaction-cost minimization theory of corporate enabling law.").
97.
Daniel M. Hausermann, The Case Against Statutory Menus in Corporate Law,
9 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 45, 67 (2012).
98.
Del. Code. Ann. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7), see also supra note 83 (describing 102(b)(7)
as the "most famous of all corporate law menus").
99.
Listokin, supra note 78, at 284-85.
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advisors, are familiar with, but the investors are not. In this case, the
entrepreneurs could use their informational edge to take advantage of the
investors.
For example, an investor from the East Coast may acquiesce to a Silicon
Valley entrepreneur's request for California law. The investor may later
be surprised to learn of California law's separate class vote for common
stock-as opposed to voting with the preferred-which gives entrepreneurs
holdup value in sale of the start-up. One of us has empirically found that
this holdup power facilitated by California law allows entrepreneurs to
extract more sale proceeds than they are contractually entitled to, reducing
the investor's share. ° ° This example illustrates why, if asked to fund a
start-up domiciled in an unfamiliar state, the investors are likely to
demand a lower price for the firm's shares.
B. Normative Implications of Delaware'sFamiliarity:Negatives
1. Suboptimal Tipping
The primary downside of Delaware's familiarity advantage is that
Delaware law will still be chosen even if it is not objectively the best law
for the transaction at hand. Klausner suggests that even if there is a race
to the top for corporate charters, "Delaware may have already won without
getting to the top-and it may never have to get there." 10' As a simple
example, if five out of ten corporations would choose to incorporate in
Delaware because of its superiority, but another four choose it not because
it is better but because they are familiar with it, Delaware has increased
its lead in the incorporations race without improving its law. In a world
without a familiarity advantage, Delaware would have to improve its
corporate law to attract the additional corporations. But in the real world
with familiarity at play, Delaware law can remain stagnant and the state

100. Brian J. Broughman & Jesse M. Fried, Renegotiationof Cash Flow Rights in
the Sale of VC-BackedFirms, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 384, 392-93 (2010).
101.
Klausner, supra note 20, at 842.

will still nab the extra charters.10 2 Brett McDonnell0 describes
this possibility
3
as locking in a suboptimal corporate law regime.'
While familiarity can reduce transaction and agency costs and thus the
firm's cost of capital, it may also lock in inefficient laws.' 0 4 To put it
differently, "[c]lassical economic theory presumes that economies of scale at
some point become diseconomies of scale."' 1 5 This is the "suboptimal
tipping" concern.'0 6 Even worse than causing stagnation in Delaware law,
suboptimal tipping may allow Delaware to take harmful steps and not suffer
the consequences. Delaware may "benefit from offering law that protects
and exploits its market power."' 1 7 Delaware could begin extracting rents
in the form of franchise taxes when chosen for familiarity over substance.' °8
Delaware may also offer law that is overly indeterminate. A lack of
clarity requires more litigation-benefiting Delaware lawyers and courts
-and makes Delaware's body of law more difficult to copy.' °9 There
may also be suboptimality in other states' corporate laws, as 1Delaware's
0
familiarity advantage gives them little incentive to innovate. I
2. Path Dependence and IncreasedSwitching Costs
We previously theorized about familiarity's close relationship to network
effects and learning effects, both of which are positive reasons for firms
102. But see the case of Delaware's disastrous decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom and
other states' first move to eliminate director liability for breach of the duty of care. James
J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation andIndemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207, 1209 (1988) (reporting that the first
state to pass a law allowing director relief from duty of care breaches was Indiana in April
1986, followed by Delaware two months later in June 1986); Roberta Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 754 (1987) (studying
corporate adoption of 102(b)(7) provisions after passage of the statute and finding, on the
basis of event studies, no significant stock price reaction).
103. McDonnell, supra note 1, at 709.
104. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 73, at 721 (observing that sometimes a term
might be selected for familiarity with that term even if the term is suboptimal).
105.
Lemley & McGowan, supra note 24, at 596.
106. We borrow this terminology from Klausner. See Klausner, supra note 20, at
789.
107. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 73, at 739.
108. Barzuza, supra note 67, at 968; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 41, at 1227. See
also McDonnell, supra note 1, at 709 ("Corporations will be reluctant to switch to other
states because of the network and leaming effect advantages of being in Delaware, and so
Delaware will be able to impose significant costs on those companies.").
109. Jill E. Fisch, The PeculiarRole of the Delaware Courts in the Competitionfor
Corporate Charters,68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (2000); McDonnell, supra note 1, at
696-97.
110. Klausner, supra note 20, at 850 ("Network externalities ... may lead states to
copy Delaware law rather than attempting to serve [corporations that would benefit from
a different corporate law].").
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to incorporate in Delaware. However, familiarity could also be seen as
having elements of path dependence, or the "tendency of history to influence
present decision making.""'' Path dependence includes consideration of
the sunk costs of the original path, making a new path more costly to
undertake. " 2 It follows that even if Delaware law becomes suboptimal,
path dependence will be a reason for parties to continue to choose it. Because
of path dependence, the switching costs of choosing to incorporate in
another state are high.
Switching costs lock a party into a choice that everything else equal,
they would not prefer, but given the costs of switching, they accept." 13
Switching costs can be inherent or strategic. Inherent strategic costs "arise
from the nature of the product(s) or market." '" 4 Strategic switching costs
are choices that parties make to increase switching costs beyond their
inherent nature." 5 Incorporating in an unfamiliar state presents both
inherent and strategic switching costs. Inherently, firms that incorporate
in an unfamiliar state are faced with unknown corporate law provisions;
strategically, Delaware has been said to make its laws more difficult for
other states to copy through its case law,' 16 which increases switching
costs beyond their inherent nature.

111.
Lemley & McGowan, supranote 24, at 597. See also Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law
System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001) (arguing history matters to where we are at

present).
112.

See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L.

REV. 641, 643-44 (1996) (discussing a winding road created for period-specific and
inefficient reasons that persists despite the possibility of a more efficient straighter road
now).

113.
Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role of Switching Costs in Antitrust
Analysis: A Comparisonof Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 169, 176 (2012)

("Lock-in' is defined as switching costs that are sufficiently high so that buyers stay with
a current supplier rather than switch to a supplier whose product they consider to be
preferable (or, alternatively, that the costs of switching suppliers exceed the benefits of
switching.").

114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text; William J. Carney & George B.

Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law's Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1,
11 18 (2009) (observing the indeterminacy of Delaware law).

As Kahan and Klausner observe, switching costs are higher when
network externalities are present." 7 When network externalities and
familiarity are present, switching costs are even higher. Thus, incorporating
outside of Delaware involves substantial switching costs, which could
exacerbate suboptimal tipping.'
Domiciling outside of Delaware is more
like moving away from the Microsoft operating system embedded in most
computers than moving away from
the Google search engine-which
119
involves only the click of a button.
C. How Other States Might Still Compete With Delaware
Kahan and Kamar, as well as Bebchuk and Hamdani, have argued that
there is in fact very little competition with Delaware for incorporations. 2 0
Kahan and Kamar attribute this lack of competition to a combination of
weak economic incentives and political constraints. On the economic
side, they observe that "[o]ther than Delaware, no state structures its taxes
to gain from incorporations or stands to reap substantial benefits from
legal business by attracting incorporations."' 21 On the political side, they
note that no state has sought to replicate Delaware's Chancery Court with
a dedicated corporate law court with appointed judges and no juries. They
persuasively argue that this lack of imitation is politically driven by
pointing to Pennsylvania, where labor unions and public interest lawyers
opposed a bill to mimic Delaware courts because they prefer local juries
to hear their cases.' 22 Likewise, Bill Carney observes that politics may
cut against competition with Delaware: "The political benefits to individual
legislators of sponsoring arcane legislation such as corporate law changes
23
must be small, if they exist at all."'
Some states claim to compete for national incorporations, including
North Dakota, Nevada, and Maryland. However, these claims are probably
tepid or misnomers at best. North Dakota has tried to offer a shareholder-

117.

Kahan & Klausner, supra note 73, at 727 ("When internal learning or network

benefits are present, they result in 'switching costs' which may induce a firm to adopt the
same term repeatedly in different documents.").
118. Id. at 729 ("[T]he presence of switching costs affects the degree to which
network externalities may result in suboptimal contracting.").
119. Edlin & Harris, supra note 98, at 172-73.
120. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 3, at 684-85; see also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra
note 4, at 578.
121.
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 3, at 687; see also William J. Carney, The Production
of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 719 (1998) ("Revenues from chartering
corporations do not represent a significant income source for most large welfare states to
motivate them to write laws to attract chartering business.").
122.
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 3, at 733-34.
123. Carney, supra note 106, at 719-20.
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friendly alternative to Delaware's perceived management-friendly corporate
law. 124 So far, this has not been successful. 125 Also, while Nevada and
Maryland have been somewhat more successful in the national race, a
closer look reveals that they are each competing for specialized corporations
that Delaware does not serve. Nevada is pursuing close corporations
seeking a lax corporate law, 126 while Maryland is catering to investment
trusts, which may not even be organized
as corporations, and specifically
127
real estate investment trusts (REITs).
Therefore, states probably provide little effective national competition
to prevent Delaware from the point of suboptimal tipping. A more
effective means of state competition may come from states trying to keep
their own incorporations at "home." Roberta Romano has most prominently
suggested that states engage in this "defensive competition."'' 28 Romano
finds a correlation between a state's franchise
tax revenues and responsiveness
29
on four corporate law innovations. 1
Kahan and Kamar debate whether this defensive competition occurs,
and the incentives for it to occur.' 30 Carney, on the other hand, observes
that defensive competition may occur because local lawyers benefit from
it. 131 Because local lawyers specialize in the corporate law of their home
state, they face little competition from out-of-state lawyers, who are
unfamiliar with home-state law.'3 2 There may be spillover advantages to

124.

Martha Graybow, Delaware Beware: North Dakota Wants Your Business,

REUTERS, Apr. 25, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN2543618
020070425 [http://perma.cc/V5NE-BW9K].
125.
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why the North Dakota Publicly Traded
CorporationsAct Will Fail,84 N.D. L. REV. 1043, 1045-47 (2008) (enumerating the reasons
why North Dakota's gambit will not succeed).
126.
Kahan and Kamar, supra note 3, at 717; Barzuzu, supra note 67, at 940-41.
127.
Kahan and Kamar, supra note 3, at 721-22 (discussing Maryland's investment

trust business).
128.
Romano, supra note 43, at 226.
129.
Id.at 233,239.
130. Kahan and Kamar, supra note 3, at 699-700.
131.
Carney, supra note 106, at 722-23. Macey and Miller also observed a similar
local-bar influence on Delaware corporate law. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472,
522-32 (1987).
132.
Carney, supra note 106, at 723 ("By specializing in the law of their own state,

local lawyers can generally limit competition for services for their locally incorporated
clients to members of the local bar.").

local communities from keeping entrepreneurial firms home. 3 3 However,
it is unclear to what extent home-state competition actually keeps Delaware
from suboptimally tipping. As noted in our dataset, Delaware wins the
bimodal race with home states by a wide margin. 134 On the other hand,
states with better corporate laws tend to keep more of their own chartering
business. 135
D. Even Without Effective State Competition, Will DelawareLaw
Become Suboptimal?
The previous Section argued that states may have some incentives to
compete with Delaware, either for specialized national firms as Maryland
has with REITs, or more likely, to retain in-state incorporations. This
Section argues that the federal government may be more effective in
pressuring Delaware to offer high-quality corporate law than Delaware's
state competitors.
In important work, Mark Roe has argued that Delaware still faces
pressure from federal authorities including Congress, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, federal courts, and the securities exchanges.' 36
Congress's 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission rules since, give the federal government control
over a key issue in corporate governance-shareholder voting.' 37 Congress
likewise took a major step to governing corporate officer conduct in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.138 In a similar vein, Robert Thompson and
Hillary Sale have observed that securities law, a federal statutory regime,
has come to consume some traditional items in corporate governance-

133. One of us has discussed these spillover advantages in retaining home-state startups. See Darian M. Ibrahim, Should Angel-Backed Start-ups Reject Venture Capital?, 2
MICH. J. PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L. 251, 264-65 (2013). However, spillover
effects such as job creation, tax revenues, etc., are related to a firm's physical presence in
a state, not its legal domicile. The spillover effects from legal domicile primarily benefit
local lawyers.
134. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
135.
Roberta Romano, Law as a Product,supra note 8, at 225, 258-60. Daines made
a similar finding in his Article on IPO firms. Daines, supra note 17, at 1600.
136. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, supranote 7 at 598-600.
137.
Id. at 611 ("The wide SEC regulation of shareholder proxies determines" most
aspects of shareholder voting, including proxy fights).
138. Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, The Feds, and The Stock Exchange: Challenges to
the First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 779, 790 (2004) ("The
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley and related rules propelled federal law to its current position
as the dominant regulator of officer conduct.").
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the states' traditional territory.' 39 Periodically calls for federal incorporation
4
also spring up, most recently after the financial crisis of 2008-2009.1 0
Therefore, Delaware may be prevented from suboptimal tipping by federal
pressure, if not pressure from other states. These are all speculations, and
more work needs to be done to determine if and when Delaware law might
suboptimally tip.
V. CONCLUSION

As one Silicon Valley VC lawyer told us: "VCs don't want to learn the
corporate-law rules of a new state. Everyone knows [the] Delaware rules,
whereas states like Washington
and Minnesota might have weird dissenter
'4
rights, so why bother?"' '
This lawyer's statement nicely captures the main contribution of this
Article. That is, while Delaware may have taken the lead in the corporate
chartering race by being superior to its rival states, it has remained on top
more for its familiarity investors than for its superiority. Our Article first
outlines the familiarity theory as a theoretical matter, distinguishing
familiarity from the economic concept of network externalities. Next we
empirically document that familiarity trumps both substantive quality and
network externalities in explaining why firms domicile in Delaware.
The normative implications of our familiarity findings are both positive
and negative. Familiarity is a positive because it reduces the transaction
and agency costs of financing a firm and thus the firm's cost of capital.
However, at some point Delaware law may suboptimally tip and continue
to be chosen even if it offers worse law than other states. This would
enable Delaware to extract rents through increased franchise taxes.
When the tipping point to suboptimal law is reached is an open question.
Empirical work finds that Delaware firms are worth more than firms
incorporated elsewhere, 142 suggesting that Delaware is still producing

139.
Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities FraudasCorporate Governance:
Reflections on Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2003); Thompson, supra note

123, at 784-85.
140.

See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., For OptionalFederalIncorporation,35 J. CORP.

L. 499, 501 (2010) (stating that the "current economic downturn" has revealed more
problems with state incorporation).
141.
Interview by Brian Broughman & Jeffery Ibrahim with Anonymous, notes on
file with Authors.
142.
Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON.
525, 527 (2001); see also Romano, Law as a Product,supra note 8.

superior corporate law despite its familiarity advantage. Other work
disputes this conclusion. 143 We have suggested possible reasons why
Delaware remains in check despite its familiarity advantage, including the
fact that states still have some incentive to compete for either specialized
national firms or to retain their home-state corporations, and that the
federal government is keeping Delaware in check.

143.

Carney, Shepherd & Bailey, supra note 11, at 127-28.
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VI. APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS FOR TABLE 5

Variable Name
Delaware

Definition
equals one if the firm is incorporated in Delaware,
and zero otherwise;
Out-of-State
the number of out-of-state investors participating in
Investors
the round;
Local Exposure the number of out-of-state investors participating in
a financing round that have previously financed a
firm within the sample of 1850 start-ups that is
incorporated in the start-up's home state;
State Inc. Count the number of publicly held firms incorporated in
the start-up's home state.
ABCA state
equals one if the firm is located in an MBCA state,
and zero otherwise;
In-State
is the number of in-state investors participating in
Investors
the round;
Investment
equals the amount of financing received in the new
($4
round (in millions of dollars);
VC Reputation equals the average age, as of 2010, of the VC firms
participating in a round of financing
JudicialQuality the Chamber of Commerce 2001 score for each
state's judicial quality
Flexibility
an index variable (0 to 4) measuring how much
flexibility a state's corporate law provides144for firms
to design their governance arrangements
Franchise Tax
equals the sum of the home state's initial incorporation
fee and its annual franchise tax and/or annual report
fee, minus the sum of the home state's foreign
qualification fee and its annual foreign report fee,
based on tax rates as of 1/1/2000 and an assumption
of 100,000 shares outstanding (par value = $.001/
share)
West of
equals one if the firm is located in a state located
Mississippi
west of the Mississippi River, and zero otherwise.

144.

The index scale for Flexibility is defined in Kahan, supra note 81, at 343-44.
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